Churchill to blame for fall of Singapore? Not completely says Roger Boniface I REFER to the report "Winston Churchill alone was to blame" (ST, April 5). I am surprised that such eminent historians as Mr Correlli Barnett and Dr Ong Chit Chung can take the oversimplified view that Churchill was totally to blame for the fall of Singapore and that Operation Matador was the key to British military failure in Malaya. As early as July 1941, the War Cabinet in London had already accepted that Malaya was indefensible owing to the fall of Indochina to the Japanese, which gave them the use of 19 airfields and more than 1,000 land-based planes to attack northern Malaya without the need to take over airfields in southern Thailand, thus making Operation Matador redundant even before a shot was fired in defence of Malaya. Moreover, the airfields were small and tended to flood in the rainy seasons, thus making them useless. In fact, the Japanese lost many aircraft during the short time they used them. To compound the issue, Britain was already at war on two other fronts and supplying Russia with war equipment. Also, Britain did not have the men or aircraft to defend Malaya (a total of 550 first-line planes were needed). Whatever Churchill may or may not have been, a magician he certainly was not! To make matters worse, the British needed at least 24 hours' notice to implement Operation Matador. As the Japanese did not declare war and attacked without warning, this made the operation worthless. Also, it must be remembered that, although Pearl Harbour was attacked on Dec 7 and Singora bombed on Dec 8, many historians have assumed that the British had their 24 hours' notice. In fact, the International Dateline made the attack on Singora even earlier than the attack on the Americans. However, Operation "Krohcol" was implemented and Thai airfields were taken over by the British as far as Phuket but had to be abandoned as any landing by the Japanese in the south - for example, Kota Baru - would have put two Japanese crack divisions to the rear of any British forces, thus cutting them off. This was a point that Mr Barnett seems to have missed. The idea that Singapore could be made into a Dunkirk is based more on wishful thinking because to load 300,000 British troops on to the available ships defies logic and could not have been done as there were not enough ships in the area to complete the task. Furthermore, a Japanese task force was waiting outside Singapore waters for such an eventuality. Mr Barnett does not understand that the political repercussions as well as circumstances that led to Dunkirk could not be duplicated in Singapore. When Tokyo radio announced that there would be "no Dunkirk in Singapore" it showed that the Japanese had a better grasp of the situation than Mr Barnett did. As for General Percival, many of his most senior officers did not view him as a leader but as a bureaucrat: his nickname "rabbit" reflected the view that he did not inspire confidence. Churchill did not send two divisions into captivity because of bad leadership, as Mr Barnett implies, but because of pressure from the prime minister of Australia. He diverted the two troopships which "went into the Japanese bag" to show that Britain was going to fulfil its commitments in the region. Also, it is wrong to think that those two divisions could have changed the scene in Burma as they were desert-trained and equipped and were of little use in the jungles of Burma. The fall of Burma could not be stopped even by jungle-trained troops! The doctrine of ministerial responsibility would make Churchill responsible for the fall of Singapore, but he was not wholly to blame. This letter appeared in The Straits Times forum page on Apr 8, 1997. Fall of Singapore: Should Churchill take the rap? Correlli Barnett, former keeper of the Churchill archives Dr Ong Chit Chung Chan Kwee Sung Dr Brian P. Farrell Chan Kwee Sung (second letter) Dr Ong Chit Chung (second letter) Roger Boniface Roger Boniface (second letter) Fight to death, Churchill told British Army Moses' start page Copyright © 1998 Singapore Press Holdings. All Rights Reserved.